1
Thanks are due to the participants in the Protest|Culture workshops for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter. 2 There is no universally recognised Marxist concept of culture (and there is of course a refusal to reify or eternalise such concepts within Marx's own thought). The twentieth-century reorganisations of European capitalism saw figures such as Gramsci attempting to elaborate a way of understanding the ways in which culture was articulated within such societies, and to understand the continuities and ruptures with earlier forms and other contexts, a central theme in the Prison Notebooks.
In particular, I will argue, this experience leads this kind of western Marxist theorist to highlight the ways in which social movements articulate popular culture, both being shaped by it and helping to develop it further.
Meanwhile, from a different direction -harder to articulate theoretically but welldeveloped as research practice -"history from below" (MARHO 1983) , the work of British and French Marxist historians (Kaye 1995) and much oral history (Paul Thompson 1982) have paid significant and influential attention to the cultural underpinnings of historical social movements. From a Marxist standpoint, where practice is the ultimate test of theory, it is important to pay attention to less conceptually-oriented authors whose deployment of Marxist research methodology has opened up fruitful new directions in research.
these are shaped through their material situation -their struggle to meet basic needs and their relationships with each other and with other social groups.
2) This is a developmental rather than a static perspective: organising rather than organisation, culture-making rather than culture-being. Social movement cultures articulate the bottom-up learning processes inherent in this process, as groups develop the "local rationalities", "tacit knowledge" or "good sense" involved in daily survival and in conflictual relationships with other groups, finding a way of thinking more adequate to their experience, a way of being which is more adequate to their daily struggles and needs, and developing appropriate organisational cultures 5 .
3) This developmental process runs into limits set by dominant institutions at various points and is thus (conflictually) dialogical: that is, it cannot be understood separately from the encounter with power, exploitation and cultural authority or as distinct from the attempt to form alliances, generalise movements and construct alternative possible worlds in dialogue with relationships both of consent and coercion.
It will be seen that this is a logical order rather than a chronological one, distinguishing three aspects of a single process which can be understood as culture-in-movement rather than "movement culture" as a noun. As I will suggest, this processual or directional approach is what distinguishes the western Marxist perspective from its non-Marxist offspring. I say "offspring" because the authors covered here have been enormously influential -or, to put it another way, this perspective has shown us another way to read the social world which has proved convincing and illuminating in a very wide range of different contexts. So much so, in fact, that many non-Marxist authors have borrowed heavily from it, knowingly or otherwise. This in turn strongly suggests (which is all that can be done in a chapter of this length) that assent to any of these propositions in isolation does not depend on being a Marxist, but is a reasonable conclusion for social researchers looking at a particular aspect of the relationship between social movements and culture.
However -and here is where directionality becomes important once again -what sets off the non-Marxist writers mentioned here is that each of them acknowledges one aspect of the western Marxist approach without making the connections to the others.
5
I do not here mean that there is an obvious or pre-given outcome of any of these learning processes. Indeed, they are often internally contested as people argue over how to speak, how to behave and how to organise; but these arguments are won or lost in relation to people's apprehension of their situation and needs.
Thus, for example, a relationship between movement culture and daily life is admitted, without theorising how the one is produced from the other. Alternatively, movements are conceptualised in learning terms but without this learning being related back to material situations. Or again, the symbolic dialogue with power is acknowledged but without a sense that the dialogue can go one way or the other, that in a revolutionary period a new common sense from below can overthrow the once-hegemonic discourse of the old masters, while in a period of movement defeat popular discourses can be disaggregated, silenced and colonised by the rulers. My discussion of non-Marxist writers is thus doubleedged: they add to the prima facie case for taking this interpretation seriously, but also show what is distinctive about the processual Marxist understanding.
In discussing each proposition, I first present it in substantive terms; secondly I show its partial acceptance by non-Marxist writers; thirdly I show how western Marxist authors integrate it into a wider perspective.
1) Social movement cultures and everyday lifeworlds
How we organise reflects who we are: this is in a sense completely unsurprising. No doubt there are times when we create something completely original, times when we are schooled in a particular organising tradition and times when we are inspired by a movement elsewhere. In each case, however, these initial models are passed through the filters of how we attempt to make these ideas make sense in our own context and with the people we are organising with. More commonly, of course, social movement actors do not instantly think of themselves as doing something radically outside the ordinary (or seek to avoid the perception that they are asking something unprecedented and perhaps illegitimate of each other) and so tend to draw on modes of interacting, everyday life skills and ways of thinking which are already familiar in the lifeworld within which they are organising.
Thus, for example, it is unsurprising if medieval peasant movements reproduced much of the particularism, faith in distant rulers as against immediate exploiters and religious morality of the world they sprang from. At the opposite end of the scale, Linebaugh and Rediker's work (2000; Rediker 1987 Rediker , 2004 on the politics of the Atlantic working class shows neatly how the practice of piracy sprang from the work relations of the commercial sailing ship, how the transmission of skills among political radicals followed trans-oceanic trade patterns and how the internationalism of these radicals reproduced that of the new Atlantic economy. From the sublime to the less grandiose, I have found in setting up alternative kindergartens that organisational patterns all too often reproduces the friendship politics of the kinds of parents who become involved; an experience paralleled in Avrich's (2005) analysis of anarchist school projects.
More formally, western Marxists have regularly sought to show how social movement cultures are intimately related with the popular cultures and everyday lifeworlds of their participants (Thompson 1991) . Putting the same point in a different way, they have equally sought to show the implicit politics of popular culture (Hall and Jefferson 1991) , the extent to which popular religion can be organisation by another name (Hill 1975) , and so on. For western Marxists, then, "social movement culture" is not something separate from popular culture. Effective social movements draw on neighbourhood networks, workplace skills, popular music, local emotional repertoires and shared symbolic references.
Non-Marxist writers have often agreed (see also Ullrich / Keller and Baumgarten, this volume). Nancy Naples' (1998) oral history of women community organisers in poor and Latino communities in East Coast US cities shows how their "activist mothering" extends caring relationships beyond their own families to the young women organisers whom they mentor, as well as more broadly an ethic of care for their communities. Lichterman's (1996) ethnography of distinct modes of environmental organising draws similar conclusions for anti-toxics campaigners in poor communities, who resist being distinguished from their neighbours as "activists". Conversely, the white service-class members of the US Green Party whom he studied shared that class's extreme mobility and disconnection from family and community of origin, constructing new kinds of elective families in ways not dissimilar to Maffesoli's (1996) "urban tribes".
Similarly, McKay's (1996) historical account of radical subcultures in Britain uses classic British Cultural Studies models of analysis, which routinely highlighted the political aspects of apparently cultural phenomena (Hall and Jefferson 1991) , to show that they can be equally applied to subcultures with an overtly political edge; while Hetherington (2000) makes in some ways the same point in reverse when he describes British New Age Travellers in terms of a style subculture. In all these cases, what is being said is that how we organise reflects who we are, quite normally and naturally.
Materialist implications
A Marxist analysis of social movement culture underlines this point, drawing out a series of materialist implications. One is that "who we are" is shaped by our material circumstances and struggles: at the most basic, social movements are part of the "political Finally, and perhaps most significantly, how a given lifeworld is organised is already political (Thompson 1991). It is not that we first have an apolitical lifeworld (whatever that might look like), and then (perhaps with the addition of "culture" or "politics"), social movements arise -or that, as Habermas (1981) suggested, movements represent the defence of (private but authentic) lifeworlds against the logics of economics and the state.
Rather, how people conceive of, and struggle to meet, their needs is itself a politics, which may take a range of forms: clientelism, institutional loyalty, religion, protest and so ongrounded in their material situations but with wider-reaching effects (Gramsci 1971 ).
These situations are themselves routinely contested: if there is a simple opposition between the politics of "keep your head down" (Scott 1990) and that hostile to "raggedtrousered philanthropy" (Tressell 1993) , there may well be competing clientelist networks along with movements attempting to assert popular power outside of elite mediation; or a 6 With Gottlieb (1989) , I see the integration of feminist, anti-racist and world-systems perspectives as a deepening rather than a contradiction of materialist perspectives which were often originally expressed primarily in relation to social class. working-class community or family may be divided between religious and political modes of organising. If everyday culture in this sense is at the same time everyday politics, it is not homogenous; and this is the point of Gramsci's Southern Question analysis (1978) -organising depends on contradiction.
In this first proposition, culture appears primarily as a "whole way of being", a way of "doing" the everyday, including everyday organising (or everyday music or religion with political implications). What is highlighted is the relationship between these two apparently separate terms, culture and social movements.
2) A developmental perspective on social movement culture and knowledge
There is, it will be evident, an intellectual problem at this point. What might be called a base-superstructure model of movement culture would presumably propose that social movement activism is a superstructure, reflective in some sense of a base in lifeworlds themselves structured in material ways (for example, of class, gender and race). If, however, lifeworlds are already political with a small p -that is, the way we act has articulating further rationalities which are expressed in popular lifeworlds and attempting to meet needs which require action beyond the lifeworld.
These "local rationalities" are local because they are organised around particular, situated, material relationships of exploitation, power and cultural hierarchies. They are rationalities because they are ways of doing things which respond to something real: the need to feed children, the pressures of workplace management, the assertion of human dignity in the face of racism -but also because they may be more or less adequate to these Wainwright argues that non-powerful participants in society come to hold various forms of unofficial or tacit practical knowledge which represent the "slave" part of Hegel's masterslave relationship: outside the ken or theology of managers, policy-makers, international financial institutions and so on but nevertheless key to everyday survival as expressions of unmet needs, "illegitimate" experiences and unofficial coping strategies. Crucially, such knowledge is best articulated collectively. Using the paradigmatic example of feminist consciousness-raising, she argues that it is such knowledge that social movements develop into challenges to the existing order.
In other words, a materialist understanding of social movement culture sees it not just as situated. It also sees culture in general, and a fortiori those aspects of culture which we can distinguish as articulated social movements, as attempts to be adequate to this situatedness. These attempts might be more or less successful -in the eyes of an academic observer or, more urgently, in the eyes of local participants who argue over how to do things as well as working things out less consciously in relation to their actual situations.
The outcomes of these arguments are not a foregone conclusion, and should not be reified theoretically. In contrast to the conservative implications of Scott's (1990) "hidden transcripts" argument 7 (based in part on fieldwork in Malaysia after the British counterinsurgency campaign), for example, the argument does not assume that hidden transcripts must stay hidden -the fear of repression which is central to Scott's analysis is a historically specific condition which can be overcome (Nilsen 2012). At times, the oppressed do rise up; at others, they do not.
But if -for example -a peasant organiser has to convince other peasants that the landlords or their military backers are neither God-given, trustworthy or invincible -how can we theorise this kind of complex consciousness? Gramsci's (1991) analysis of peasant consciousness, drawing in large part on his own reflections on Sardinian life (Nairn 1982), offers a useful contrast between "common sense" and "good sense". Within consciousness -and within the lifeworld -many different forces co-exist, including both Wainwright's tacit knowledge and the official, hegemonic perspectives (and, indeed, those represented by the "traditional intellectuals" of older social situations such as the village priest or lawyer and those represented by the "organic intellectuals" of rising groups such as peasant activists).
"Good sense", for Gramsci, then represents that core of "common sense" (the actuallyexisting mixture of hegemonic attitudes, practical good sense and historical residues in everyday consciousness: Ytterstad 2011) which actually expresses one's own material situation -and hence the needs, experiences and problems contained in it. Ideas, practices, movements and institutions which are subject to fewer constraints of external power and exploitation enable this good sense to be more fully expressed. Marxist writers on culture have developed this analysis into fields as widely-differing as popular religion (Barrow
1986) and working-class Marxist theory (Macintyre 1986).
This, incidentally, is another way of stating Lukács' often-misunderstood position on class consciousness (1971, 2000) , which he explicitly presents as a Weberian ideal-type construction: given particular interests and a particular context, a certain logic of action is likely to be followed, all else being equal. Of course historically all else is very often not equal. Since the rise of industrial capitalism, for example, workers have routinely attempted to improve their situations (as Thompson puts it, "no worker in history ever had surplus value taken out of his [sic] hide without finding a way of resisting" (1966: 115)), but the forms which this has taken and the outcomes of those strategies have been anything other than neatly predictable.
Another approach, this time highlighting the development of institutions, is Lebowitz' "political economy of labour" (2003), which sees human needs (understood as sociallydetermined and themselves developmental rather than abstractly given) as continually and necessarily giving rise, on the part of those who do not control the means of production, to attempts to meet them. Thus family and community solidarity are just as much a part of this process as are "cultures of solidarity" (Fantasia 1988) or membership of unions and socialist parties; "our common history" (Paul Thompson 1982) consists to a significant degree of the constantly-disrupted attempt to extend this logic as far as possible within current situations. Not, as Williams, once put it, a "whole way of life", so much as (EP Thompson) a "whole way of struggle" (Hall 1989 ) .
Thompson's understanding of the development of the English working class as a learning process has been powerfully explored by Vester (1970; see also Cox 2013) . Cox (2011) explores another approach to this Marxist analysis of social movements, according to which social movements are developmental expressions of the materially-grounded "local rationalities" of the social situations which give birth to them (Nilsen 2010).
Here I want simply to note the value and the limitations of this analysis. Its value is in offering a coherent and socially-situated analysis of the genesis, persistence and general direction of social movements, as outlined above. Its limitation is that it does not, and cannot, account for the specific history of a particular movement, campaign or organisation. From the point of view of "movement-relevant theory", however, what this means is that this approach does not see the path followed by a particular movement as inevitable; rather, it posits the movement as necessary and its specifics as the outcomes of internal struggles -and provides, in the notions of local rationality, tacit knowledge, needs and so on -a yardstick by which to measure whether the organisations and strategies currently being pursued are helpful and appropriate or not.
Non-Marxist writers have also attempted a cognitive / learning analysis of social movements, whether in terms of the development of alternative movement knowledge (Eyerman and Jamison 1990) ; health and emotional practices (Anne Scott 1998) or counter-cultures (Buckner 1971) . However, without a sense of a material base, nonMarxists lack the directional and evaluative components identified above which make it possible to go beyond blanket celebrations or dismissals of movement institutions in terms of their supposed intrinsic qualities -and ask how far they succeed in expressing the popular needs and understandings which underpin the movement or when, and in what circumstances, they can enable substantial social change.
Social movements, culture ... and revolutions
Finally, we can note that the Marxist tradition proposes a specific role for revolutionary and social movement experience in transforming "common sense" into "good sense": Marx and Engels (1971: 53) proposed that it was only in such contexts that a whole class, rather than simply individuals, could shift the "muck of ages", the hegemonic perspectives instilled into them, and come to see the world anew. Parts at least of the "muck of ages", even parts which claimed to be Marxist, were jettisoned and new understandings developed and fought out: as I write this, in Tahrir Square and Egyptian ballot boxes, for example. This, too, is part of the Marxist analysis of culture and social movements: the understanding that revolutions are necessarily also major cultural events. This is why oral histories of the civil rights movement (Hampton et al. 1995 ), 1968 (Fraser 1988 In this second aspect of the western Marxist approach, then, culture appears as the developmental, contested, learning process of attempting to develop "a whole way of struggle": it is precisely the learning, the development and the contestation which are highlighted.
3) Speaking (back) to power
All of this brings us to the social totality. If, as I have proposed above, social movements represent the attempt to meet popular needs, express tacit knowledge, distil "good sense" from "common sense" and create more adequate institutional orders, they do this in the teeth of exploitation, hegemonic cultural orders, and political power (Thompson 1976 (Thompson , 1993 . Pace Holloway (2002) , there are limits to "changing the world without taking power". One cannot simply "speak truth to power" (Havel 1990) , literally or metaphorically: as we know from our everyday experience, power will bite back when challenged (this is why, if movements are absent or repressed, Scott's hidden transcripts stay hidden).
A more formal way of stating this is that social movements naturally encounter dominant institutions, or indeed counter-movements (such as racist movements, anti-feminist backlashes, fascist mobilisation, religious fundamentalism and so on). There is, as these examples suggest, a substantial extent to which these conflicts are fought out on the terrain of coercion or domination: people are sacked, beaten up, vilified, killed and otherwise punished for opposing the social order, and in these situations (as too where the forces at stake are massively uneven) solidarity and support becomes the order of the day (Olesen 2005) , and the relevant institutions -be they workers' militias, civil rights lawyers, support networks of feminist scholars, or Zapatista solidarity -are a normal part of certain movement situations.
More important from the point of view of movement culture, however, is the symbolic dialogue that develops. As Rediker's (2004) analysis of the "dialogue of terror" between pirates and navies shows, such dialogues are not absent from situations of coercion (ní Dhorchaigh and Cox 2011); they are, however, strategically central where what is at stake is the search for consent. Thus Barker's (2006) analysis of the struggle over language when hospitals are closed in the name of "community" and through processes described as "consultation" highlights how movements attempt to reclaim the language of the state for their own purposes. These particular terms, of course, like those of democracy, were once popular languages, and the state's use of them is intended to elicit consent through this symbolic land-grab. Similarly, Wainwright's (2009) Reclaim the state describes in bitter and hilarious detail the struggle by Luton's Exodus Collective to exercise "participatory" and "community" agency in the teeth of a local state committed in theory to furthering both and in practice to preventing any actual participation by local movements.
That movements and the state are in symbolic dialogue with one another -or struggle for ownership of terms like participation, democracy, consultation, community -is not simply a question of linguistic piracy or privateering, nor is it simply a question of participants internalising someone else's discourse (Baumgarten and Ullrich 2012), any more than the religious radicalism of the English Revolution (Hill 1975 , Holstun 2000 simply represented a capitulation to the power of religion. At times, of course, it is both, as well as a dialogue with potential allies. 
Implications for research
Intellectually, this Marxist approach to social movements and culture justifies itself in enabling an explanation of cultural and movement categories which static sets of concepts often naturalise. The relationship between organising modes and lifeworlds, between popular needs and movement demands, between the institutions of movement milieux (Taylor and Whittier 1992) and the "hidden transcripts" they express, or between the competing meanings given by movements and official institutions to the same concepts, can be thought as aspects of the contested development of popular needs and lifeworlds through movements' own ideas and practices to the encounter with more powerful institutions. Movement culture, in other words, can be thought through with movingdevelopmental and dialogical -categories, rather than in the conceptual equivalent of dictionary definitions, isolated and static.
Such an approach does not require participatory research methodologies. However, its focus on movement organising and strategy enables engaged researchers to draw on and tackle forms of practice-oriented thought and experience which more formalised models often rule out; to that extent it meets Bevington and Dixon's (2005) call for "movementrelevant theory" (see also Barker and Cox 2002) .
More generally, Marxism has always highlighted the interrelationship between theory and practice, and this is true for Marxist writing itself. The more theoretically articulate writers in this tradition, such as Williams or Gramsci, are nonetheless often metaphorical in their theoretical attempts to articulate research problems, and without the example of the rest of their writings they would hardly have inspired such an extensive range of successors.
Conversely, Thompson (1978) was openly hostile to overly-schematic theoretical writing, but was immensely influential in a range of approaches to history precisely because of the strength of his research practice (MARHO 1983) . These examples of good practice have had successors out of all proportion to the degree to which they, or critics, have analysed their overt theory (substantially in the case of Gramsci; in very limited ways for Williams; barely at all for Thompson).
There are good reasons for this, in that (as Thompson put it) we as writers or researchers do not live these situations. We may be more fluent and confident in how we articulate the needs and experiences underlying a particular movement, the everyday cultures and learning processes involved, or the complexities of the symbolic dialogue with power, and we may have a greater breadth of information and comparisons available to us (not always!), but we typically lack the depth of lived experience of this particular situation, and all the aspects (some only half-recognised or tacitly assumed) which practitioners are attempting to juggle and think through as they change how to do things.
Theorists in this tradition contribute by asking questions -about how adequate a particular strategy is to a particular problem -rather than arbitrarily importing external criteria. Such questions return the initiative to movement participants in their identification of what the issues are, their arguments over how to achieve the goal and their reflections on what their purposes are, and encourage a greater articulation and discussion around these. If there is an external criterion, it is that movements do need to work out something, take things further -that they are movements, not a static entity to comment on but a fraught attempt to do something.
It is appropriate, then, that writing in this tradition rarely if ever takes the form of an authoritative pronouncement "this is how things are", and tends instead to the use of metaphors, the identification of relationships and processes, in ways which people in other movement situations again can recognise themselves -offering a language whose main role is to be reworked by others as they struggle to articulate their own needs, develop their own movements and fight their own battles.
